पूरे रीगन-थैचर युग के दौरान बैंकरों को हर बात के लिए बकरा बनाया गया, एक ऐसा दौर जिसने वित्तीय व्यवस्था को बहुत ऊंचा उठाया और उद्योग-धंधों को कमजोर किया, और जिसकी वजह से तरक्की के फल असमान रूप से रईसों और अति-धनवानों की झोली में चले गए।
Bankers were scapegoats for the whole Reagan-Thatcher era, which exalted finance and humbled industry, and which had allowed the fruits of progress to accrue disproportionately to the rich and super-rich.
Bankers were scapegoats for the whole Reagan-Thatcher era, which exalted finance and humbled industry, and which had allowed the fruits of progress to accrue disproportionately to the rich and super-rich.
अपने जीवन के अंतिम वर्षों में हेयेक बीसवीं सदी के आखिरी पच्चीस सालों के सबसे प्रभावशाली बौद्धिक विचारक बन गए थे।
Hayek became in his later years the dominant intellectual influence of the last quarter of the twentieth century.
Hayek became in his later years the dominant intellectual influence of the last quarter of the twentieth century.
अमेरिकियों को ऐसा महसूस होता है कि वे केवल और केवल पहले नंबर पर ही रह सकते हैं और अगर वे नंबर एक पर नहीं हैं, तो मानों दुनिया का अंत ही आ गया है।
Americans feel as though the only position they can possibly occupy is number one and if they're not number one, well, the end of the world has come.
Americans feel as though the only position they can possibly occupy is number one and if they're not number one, well, the end of the world has come.
आपको बस वापस नैतिक दर्शन (moral philosophy) की तरफ लौटना होगा और यह कहना होगा कि ठीक है, लालच होता है, लोग ज़्यादा से ज़्यादा पाना चाहते हैं, लेकिन फिर ऐसी कौन सी चीज़ है जो उन्हें रोकती है? अतीत में उन्हें जिस चीज़ ने रोक रखा था, वह जीवन का वह नज़रिया था जिसमें अपनी संतुष्टि ही सबसे महत्वपूर्ण चीज़ नहीं होती थी; बल्कि यह था कि आपको बस ज़रूरत भर की चीज़ चाहिए और आप कह सकें, "बस, अब बहुत हो गया।" शायद धर्म आपको इस बात तक पहुँचा दे, या फिर केवल पारंपरिक नैतिक दर्शन, लेकिन आपके पास इनमें से कुछ न कुछ होना ही चाहिए, वरना आप हमेशा ऐशो-आराम की अंधी दौड़ में ही दौड़ते रहेंगे।
You do just have to go back to moral philosophy and you've got to say, okay, there is greed, people do want more and more, but then what restrains them and what restrained them in the past was a view of life in which one's satisfaction wasn't the most important thing, that you just, you needed enough and you could say, "Enough is enough." Maybe religion will get you there, maybe just classic moral philosophy, but you have to have some of that, or else you're always on the gravy train.
You do just have to go back to moral philosophy and you've got to say, okay, there is greed, people do want more and more, but then what restrains them and what restrained them in the past was a view of life in which one's satisfaction wasn't the most important thing, that you just, you needed enough and you could say, "Enough is enough." Maybe religion will get you there, maybe just classic moral philosophy, but you have to have some of that, or else you're always on the gravy train.
आपको क्या लगता है, अक्टूबर 2008 में अगर सरकार ने दखल न दिया होता तो क्या होता? अर्थव्यवस्था की बर्बादी पूरी तरह से अकल्पनीय होती। और फिर भी पारंपरिक अर्थशास्त्री कहते हैं, "ओह, नहीं-नहीं, अर्थव्यवस्था खुद-ब-खुद बहुत आराम से संभल जाती, कुछ हफ़्तों की तकलीफ के बाद सब कुछ पहले की तरह सामान्य हो जाता, भले ही बैंकिंग व्यवस्था पूरी तरह तबाह हो जाती।" और यही बात सबसे ज़्यादा झुंझलाने वाली है कि आज वही बैंकर वापस आकर यह कह रहे हैं कि जो कुछ भी हुआ वह सब सरकार की गलती थी। सरकार ने ही उनकी खाल बचाई थी। सरकार ऐसा करना नहीं चाहती थी, लेकिन हम बाकी लोगों को बचाने के लिए उसे उनकी खाल बचाना जरूरी था।
What would've happened, do you think, had the government not intervened in October 2008? The catastrophe to the economy would've been absolutely unbelievable. And yet classical economists say, "Oh, well, no, it would've adjusted perfectly happily, a few weeks of pain and then everything would've gone on as before, without a banking system left." And that's what makes it so maddening, that these bankers are back saying it was all the government's fault. The government saved their skins. It didn't want to, but it needed to save their skins in order to save the rest of us.
What would've happened, do you think, had the government not intervened in October 2008? The catastrophe to the economy would've been absolutely unbelievable. And yet classical economists say, "Oh, well, no, it would've adjusted perfectly happily, a few weeks of pain and then everything would've gone on as before, without a banking system left." And that's what makes it so maddening, that these bankers are back saying it was all the government's fault. The government saved their skins. It didn't want to, but it needed to save their skins in order to save the rest of us.
जब आप हर चीज़ को सिर्फ पैसे के चश्मे से देखने लगते हैं, तो शायद ही कभी कुछ भी आपको पर्याप्त लगता है। मेरा मतलब है, आखिर कितना पैसा काफी होता है? क्योंकि पैसे को साजो-सामान या चीज़ों में बदलना आसान नहीं होता। और मुझे लगता है कि लोग... एक बार जब वे धन को सिर्फ पैसे के रूप में सोचना शुरू कर देते हैं, तो वे 'पर्याप्त होने' के अहसास को ही भूल जाते हैं।
When you think of everything in terms of just money, then almost nothing is enough. I mean, how much money is enough? Because it's hard to translate money into goods. And I think people, once, I think there's a lot things can believe, and once they start thinking about wealth in terms of money, they lose the idea of enough-ness.
When you think of everything in terms of just money, then almost nothing is enough. I mean, how much money is enough? Because it's hard to translate money into goods. And I think people, once, I think there's a lot things can believe, and once they start thinking about wealth in terms of money, they lose the idea of enough-ness.
यह कह देना काफी नहीं है कि "देखो, बैंकर अत्यधिक लालची थे और उन्होंने खूब धोखाधड़ी की।" मेरा मतलब है, बात सिर्फ इतनी नहीं है; उन्हें खुली छूट दे दी गई थी, इंसानी फितरत की उस खास प्रवृत्ति को अपनी सबसे अच्छी और सबसे बुरी हरकतें करने की पूरी छूट दे दी गई थी। राजनेता और नीति-निर्माता तो बस विचारों के उपभोक्ता होते हैं। उनके पास अपने खुद के कोई विचार कभी नहीं होते, विचारों को विकसित करने में बहुत मेहनत लगती है, इसलिए वे उन्हें रेस्तरां के मेनू की तरह उठाते हैं और वही चुनते हैं जो उनके अनुकूल हो। वित्तीय सेवाओं को उनकी उचित जगह से आगे बढ़ने की खुली छूट दे दी गई, जबकि अतीत में उन्हें एक दायरे में बांधकर रखा जाता था।
It's not enough say, "Look, bankers were immensely greedy and that they committed lots of frauds." I mean, that's not, they were set free, that sort of particular proclivity in human nature was set free to do its best and its worst. Politicians and regulators are consumers of ideas. They never have any ideas of their own, it would take too much like hard work to develop ideas, you get them off menus and you pick the ones that suit you. Financial services were set free to go beyond their rightful place, a place by which they have been restrained in the past.
It's not enough say, "Look, bankers were immensely greedy and that they committed lots of frauds." I mean, that's not, they were set free, that sort of particular proclivity in human nature was set free to do its best and its worst. Politicians and regulators are consumers of ideas. They never have any ideas of their own, it would take too much like hard work to develop ideas, you get them off menus and you pick the ones that suit you. Financial services were set free to go beyond their rightful place, a place by which they have been restrained in the past.
पैसे बचाने वाले (saver) की मानसिकता और निवेश करने वाले (investor) की मानसिकता, कीन्स के 'जोखिम' (risk) और 'अनिश्चितता' (uncertainty) के अंतर से बहुत गहराई से जुड़ी हुई है। उनका मानना था कि जब भविष्य अनिश्चित होता है, तो अधिकांश बचत भविष्य में धन बढ़ाने के बजाय—जो कि पारंपरिक दृष्टिकोण था कि आप बाद में ज़्यादा उपभोग करने के लिए निवेश करने हेतु बचत करते हैं—वर्तमान में सुरक्षा हासिल करने, सुरक्षा को और पुख्ता करने की तरफ निर्देशित होती है। जिसे उन्होंने 'जमाखोरी की प्रवृत्ति' (propensity to hoard) या 'तरलता वरीयता' (liquidity preference) कहा था, वह आम तौर पर निवेश करने की प्रेरणा से कहीं अधिक मजबूत होती है।
The psychology of the saver and the psychology of the investor is very closely connected with Keynes' distinction between risk and uncertainty. When the future is uncertain, he thought that a lot of saving would be directed towards securing, securing more, getting more security in the present, rather than building wealth in the future, which was the classical view, you save in order to invest, in order to consume more later on. What he had called the propensity to hoard or liquidity preference would normally be stronger than the inducement to invest.
The psychology of the saver and the psychology of the investor is very closely connected with Keynes' distinction between risk and uncertainty. When the future is uncertain, he thought that a lot of saving would be directed towards securing, securing more, getting more security in the present, rather than building wealth in the future, which was the classical view, you save in order to invest, in order to consume more later on. What he had called the propensity to hoard or liquidity preference would normally be stronger than the inducement to invest.
निवेशक कुछ ऐसे जोखिम प्रीमियम का हिसाब लगाने की कोशिश कर रहे होते हैं जिनका वास्तविक जोखिमों से कुछ मेल बैठता हो। लेकिन वे ऐसा बहुत दूर तक नहीं कर पाते, क्योंकि कई मामलों में वास्तविक मेल वास्तव में होता ही नहीं है। इसलिए एक बार जब लोग इन कहानियों पर भरोसा करना बंद कर देते हैं, तो उसके बाद बाजार का पतन बहुत, बहुत तेजी से आ सकता है। वे कुछ समय के लिए यह मान लेते हैं कि घरों की कीमतें सही तय की गई हैं और फिर अचानक उन्हें एहसास होता है कि इसके पीछे कोई ठोस आधार ही नहीं है। लेकिन आखिर सही कीमत है क्या? हम यह भी नहीं जानते। बात बस इतनी है कि सब कुछ ऊपर-नीचे होता रहता है।
Investors are trying to work out some risk premiere that have some correspondence with actual risks. But they don't, they're not, they can't go very far that way, because the actual correspondence isn't really there in a lot of cases. So once people stop believing in these stories, and then the crash can come very, very quickly. They believe that house prices are correctly priced for some time and then suddenly they realized there's no real basis for that. But what is the correct price? We don't know that either. It's just that everything swings.
Investors are trying to work out some risk premiere that have some correspondence with actual risks. But they don't, they're not, they can't go very far that way, because the actual correspondence isn't really there in a lot of cases. So once people stop believing in these stories, and then the crash can come very, very quickly. They believe that house prices are correctly priced for some time and then suddenly they realized there's no real basis for that. But what is the correct price? We don't know that either. It's just that everything swings.
बाजार प्रणाली में ऐसा कोई स्वचालित तंत्र नहीं होता जो बचत करने की इच्छा और निवेश करने की इच्छा के बीच तालमेल बिठा सके। और इसीलिए, सरकार को या फेडरल रिजर्व (Fed), सेंट्रल बैंक या जो भी हो, उसे हस्तक्षेप करना ही पड़ता है। उसे अर्थव्यवस्था को कुल मांग (aggregate demand) में गिरावट से बचाने के लिए पर्याप्त निवेश पैदा करना ही होता है। इसलिए, यदि बाजार प्रणाली के भीतर खुद संतुलन न हो, तो आपको बाहरी संतुलन की आवश्यकता होती है और मुझे लगता है कि कीन्स का यही मानना था।
There's no automatic mechanism in a market system that reconciles the desire to save and the desire to invest. And therefore, the government has to sort of do something or the Federal Reserve, the Fed, or the Central Bank, or whatever, it has to intervene. It has to create enough investment for the economy not to suffer from a fall in aggregate demand. So, if you don't have a balance within the market system itself, then you need an external balance and that's what I think Keynes believed.
There's no automatic mechanism in a market system that reconciles the desire to save and the desire to invest. And therefore, the government has to sort of do something or the Federal Reserve, the Fed, or the Central Bank, or whatever, it has to intervene. It has to create enough investment for the economy not to suffer from a fall in aggregate demand. So, if you don't have a balance within the market system itself, then you need an external balance and that's what I think Keynes believed.