हो ची मिह ने बातचीत और समझौते की रणनीति अपनाना इसलिए बेहतर समझा, क्योंकि वे अच्छी तरह जानते थे कि सैन्य रूप से उनका क्रांतिकारी आंदोलन अपने दुश्मनों की तुलना में कमजोर था।
Ho Chi Minh preferred to use the tactics of negotiation and compromise, primarily because of his recognition that the revolutionary movement was militarily weaker than its adversaries.
Ho Chi Minh preferred to use the tactics of negotiation and compromise, primarily because of his recognition that the revolutionary movement was militarily weaker than its adversaries.
हो ची मिह अच्छी तरह जानते थे कि दुश्मन के पास उनकी सेना की तुलना में अधिक मारक क्षमता है, इसलिए उन्होंने एक सुसज्जित दुश्मन को हराने के लिए अपने क्रांतिकारी आंदोलन के उस राजनीतिक और नैतिक पक्ष को एक अचूक हथियार के रूप में इस्तेमाल करने की कोशिश की, जिसे वे श्रेष्ठ मानते थे। ये विचार मूल रूप से 1920 और 1930 के दशक में एक क्रांतिकारी के रूप में उनके शुरुआती वर्षों में उपजे थे, और फ्रांसीसी (1946-1954) तथा संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका (1959-1965) के खिलाफ हुए युद्धों के दौरान भी उनके सुझावों को प्रभावित करते रहे।
Ho Chi Minh was well aware that the enemy possessed more firepower than did his own forces, and sought to use what he viewed as the superior political and moral position of his own revolutionary movement as a trump card to defeat a well-armed adversary. These ideas were originally generated during his early years as a revolutionary in the 1920s and 1930s, and continued to influence his recommendations in the wars against the French (1946-1954) and the United States (1959-1965).
Ho Chi Minh was well aware that the enemy possessed more firepower than did his own forces, and sought to use what he viewed as the superior political and moral position of his own revolutionary movement as a trump card to defeat a well-armed adversary. These ideas were originally generated during his early years as a revolutionary in the 1920s and 1930s, and continued to influence his recommendations in the wars against the French (1946-1954) and the United States (1959-1965).
मैं यह कहने का साहस करूँगा कि व्यापक अर्थ में [हो ची मिन्ह के] विचार सफल रहे, क्योंकि वियतनाम में कम्युनिस्टों की जीत सैन्य कारणों से कम और राजनीतिक, कूटनीतिक तथा मनोवैज्ञानिक कारणों से अधिक थी। यह उन विचारों को एक श्रद्धांजलि है जिन्हें उन्होंने अपने जीवन और दर्शन में उतारा।
I would hazard the statement that in the broad sense [Ho Chi Minh's] ideas had triumphed, since the communist victory in Vietnam was a consequence of political, diplomatic, and psychological factors more than military ones. That is a tribute to the ideas that he introduced in his life and thought.
I would hazard the statement that in the broad sense [Ho Chi Minh's] ideas had triumphed, since the communist victory in Vietnam was a consequence of political, diplomatic, and psychological factors more than military ones. That is a tribute to the ideas that he introduced in his life and thought.
मुझे सबसे पहले 1964-1965 में हो ची Minh में दिलचस्पी तब हुई जब मैं विदेश विभाग के एक फॉरेन सर्विस ऑफिसर के रूप में दक्षिण वियतनाम में अमेरिकी दूतावास में तैनात था। साइगॉन की सरकार पतन के कगार पर थी और [लिंडन] जॉनसन प्रशासन वहां कम्युनिस्टों की जीत को रोकने के लिए अमेरिकी लड़ाकू सैनिकों को भेजने की तैयारी कर रहा था। मुझे पूरा विश्वास हो गया था कि अमेरिका का यह प्रयास सफल नहीं होगा क्योंकि वियत कांग की तुलना में साइगॉन सरकार में दृढ़ संकल्प की भारी कमी थी, जबकि वियत कांग में गजब का अनुशासन और आत्म-बलिदान की भावना थी।
I first became interested in Ho Chi Minh in 1964-1965 while I was stationed at the U.S. Embassy in South Vietnam as a foreign service officer with the Department of State. The government in Saigon was at the point of collapse and the [Lyndon] Johnson administration was preparing to send U.S. combat troops to prevent a communist victory there. I became convinced that the U.S. effort would not succeed because of the lack of conviction in the Saigon government compared to the discipline and sense of self-sacrifice among the Viet Cong.
I first became interested in Ho Chi Minh in 1964-1965 while I was stationed at the U.S. Embassy in South Vietnam as a foreign service officer with the Department of State. The government in Saigon was at the point of collapse and the [Lyndon] Johnson administration was preparing to send U.S. combat troops to prevent a communist victory there. I became convinced that the U.S. effort would not succeed because of the lack of conviction in the Saigon government compared to the discipline and sense of self-sacrifice among the Viet Cong.
राष्ट्रपति [जे.एफ.] कैनेडी के शब्दों में कहें तो मुझे ऐसा नहीं लगा कि हम [साइगॉन सरकार के लिए] यह युद्ध जीत सकते थे। जब मैंने दुश्मन की इस निष्ठा और समर्पण के पीछे का कारण खोजना चाहा, तो मुझे लगा कि हो ची मिन्ह का नेतृत्व और उनका करिश्माई व्यक्तित्व ही इस बात का एक बहुत बड़ा जवाब था।
I did not feel - in President [J.F.] Kennedy's words - that we could win the war for [the government in Saigon]. When I sought the reason for the dedication shown by the enemy, it seemed to me that the leadership and charisma shown by Ho Chi Minh was a major part of the answer.
I did not feel - in President [J.F.] Kennedy's words - that we could win the war for [the government in Saigon]. When I sought the reason for the dedication shown by the enemy, it seemed to me that the leadership and charisma shown by Ho Chi Minh was a major part of the answer.
[हो ची मिन्ह] हमेशा इस बात से वाकिफ थे कि चीन और वियतनाम के हालात हमेशा एक जैसे नहीं होते। उन्होंने चीन के सामने सिर झुकाया—ठीक वैसे ही जैसे उन्होंने सोवियत संघ के सामने किया था—ताकि वे उनकी मदद पा सकें, लेकिन उन्होंने चुपचाप उन बाहरी प्रभावों को सीमित करने का काम किया जिन्हें वे सही नहीं मानते थे (जैसे कि भूमि सुधार के कठोर तरीके और 'ग्रेट लीप फॉरवर्ड')। दुर्भाग्य से, बाहरी सलाह के उन रूपों से बचने में वे हमेशा सफल नहीं हो पाए जिनसे वे सहमत नहीं थे।
[Ho Chi Minh] was always conscious that conditions in China and Vietnam were not always the same. He "kowtowed" to the Chinese - as he had to the Soviet Union - in order to receive their assistance, but he quietly worked to limit those forms of influence of which he did not approve (such as the harsh forms of land reform and the Great Leap Forward). Unfortunately, he was not always successful in fending off those forms of external advice that he didn't agree with.
[Ho Chi Minh] was always conscious that conditions in China and Vietnam were not always the same. He "kowtowed" to the Chinese - as he had to the Soviet Union - in order to receive their assistance, but he quietly worked to limit those forms of influence of which he did not approve (such as the harsh forms of land reform and the Great Leap Forward). Unfortunately, he was not always successful in fending off those forms of external advice that he didn't agree with.
हो ची मिन्ह ने अर्ध-सैन्य गतिविधियों के साथ-साथ मुख्य रूप से कूटनीतिक और राजनीतिक साधनों का उपयोग करके दोनों विरोधियों [फ्रांसीसी और अमेरिकी] को हराने का प्रयास किया।
Ho Chi Minh sought to defeat both adversaries [French and American] primarily by using diplomatic and political means, combined with paramilitary activities.
Ho Chi Minh sought to defeat both adversaries [French and American] primarily by using diplomatic and political means, combined with paramilitary activities.
हो ची मिन्ह के सहयोगियों में से कोई भी राजनीतिक संघर्ष, मनोवैज्ञानिक युद्ध और कूटनीतिक तौर-तरीकों का उपयोग करने के लिए उतना समर्पित नहीं था जितना कि वह खुद थे।
None of Ho Chi Minh's colleagues was as dedicated to the use of political struggle, psychological warfare, and diplomatic means as he was.
None of Ho Chi Minh's colleagues was as dedicated to the use of political struggle, psychological warfare, and diplomatic means as he was.
जब मॉस्को की सलाह [हो ची मिन्ह] के अपने विचारों के खिलाफ होती थी—जैसे कि 1930 के दशक में—तो वे चुपचाप हालात सुधरने का इंतज़ार करते थे और प्रशांत महासागर के युद्ध की शुरुआत के साथ जब स्थिति उनके पक्ष में हुई, तब वे सक्रिय हुए।
When the advice of Moscow ran counter to [Ho Chi Minh's] own ideas - as in the 1930s - he kept his head down and waited until the situation changed in his favor with the beginning of the Pacific War.
When the advice of Moscow ran counter to [Ho Chi Minh's] own ideas - as in the 1930s - he kept his head down and waited until the situation changed in his favor with the beginning of the Pacific War.
शुरुआत से ही, जब [हो ची मिन्ह] 1920 में फ्रांसीसी कम्युनिस्ट पार्टी के सदस्य बने, तो वे एक स्वतंत्र विचारक थे जिन्होंने मार्क्सवादी-लेनिनवादी विचारों और रणनीतियों को हिंद-चीन (इंडोचाइना) की वास्तविक परिस्थितियों के अनुसार ढाला।
From the outset, when [Ho Chi Minh] became a member of the French Communist Party in 1920, he was an independent thinker who adjusted Marxist-Leninist ideas and tactics to what he perceived to be the concrete situation in Indochina.
From the outset, when [Ho Chi Minh] became a member of the French Communist Party in 1920, he was an independent thinker who adjusted Marxist-Leninist ideas and tactics to what he perceived to be the concrete situation in Indochina.
उत्तर वियतनाम के अन्य सैन्य रणनीतिकारों पर सुन त्ज़ु का कितना प्रभाव पड़ा, इस सवाल का जवाब देना थोड़ा मुश्किल है। निश्चित रूप से हनोई के कई प्रमुख नेता सुन त्ज़ु से परिचित थे और उनके विचारों का इस्तेमाल करते थे—वो गुयेन गियाप ने दुश्मन की रक्षात्मक कमियों को खोजने में इनमें से कई विचारों को लागू किया, और ऐसा ही ट्रूंग चिंच ने भी किया, जिनकी प्रसिद्ध पुस्तक 'द रेसिस्टेंस विल विन' (1947) में उत्तर वियतनामियों के अनुसरण के लिए माओ त्से-तुंग के विचारों को एक आदर्श के रूप में उद्धृत किया गया था।
The influence of Sun Tzu on other North Vietnamese military strategists is harder to answer. Certainly many of the key leaders in Hanoi were aware of Sun Tzu and made use of his ideas - Vo Nguyen Giap applied many of these ideas in seeking out weak elements in the enemy's defenses, as did Truong Chinh, whose famous treatise, The Resistance Will Win (1947), cited the ideas of Mao Zedong as a model for the North Vietnamese to follow.
The influence of Sun Tzu on other North Vietnamese military strategists is harder to answer. Certainly many of the key leaders in Hanoi were aware of Sun Tzu and made use of his ideas - Vo Nguyen Giap applied many of these ideas in seeking out weak elements in the enemy's defenses, as did Truong Chinh, whose famous treatise, The Resistance Will Win (1947), cited the ideas of Mao Zedong as a model for the North Vietnamese to follow.
1950 के दशक के उत्तरार्ध और 1960 के दशक में कई बार [हो ची मिन्ह के] विचारों को कथित तौर पर उन लोगों ने नजरअंदाज कर दिया जिन्हें लगता था कि उनका तरीका बहुत सीधा-साधा है और वे बहुत जल्दी समझौता कर लेते हैं। फ्रांसीसी और बाद में अमेरिका के साथ खुले युद्ध की शुरुआत असल में इस बात का संकेत थी कि हो ची मिन्ह कम लागत पर लड़कर जीतने के अपने उद्देश्य को हासिल करने में असफल रहे थे।
On many occasions in the late 1950s and 1960s, [Ho Chi Minh's] ideas were apparently ignored by those who felt that his approach was too naive and prone to compromise. The outbreak of open warfare with the French and later with the United States was in effect a sign of the failure of Ho Chi Minh to achieve his objective to fight and win at low cost.
On many occasions in the late 1950s and 1960s, [Ho Chi Minh's] ideas were apparently ignored by those who felt that his approach was too naive and prone to compromise. The outbreak of open warfare with the French and later with the United States was in effect a sign of the failure of Ho Chi Minh to achieve his objective to fight and win at low cost.
अगर [हो ची मिन्ह] को अपने आंदोलन की पूरी छूट (कार्टे ब्लैंच) होती, तो क्या युद्ध के परिणाम कुछ और होते? यह कहना मुश्किल है। कुछ मामलों में—जैसे 1945 और 1946 में—ऐसा लगा कि उन्होंने इस संभावना को कुछ ज्यादा ही आंक लिया था कि अमेरिका उनकी सरकार और वियतनाम लोकतांत्रिक गणराज्य (DRV) की स्वतंत्रता को मान्यता दे सकता है (हालांकि, निष्पक्षता से कहें तो उन्होंने शुरुआत में ही चेतावनी दी थी कि शीत युद्ध के कारण वाशिंगटन अंततः फ्रांस के साथ जाने का फैसला कर सकता है)।
If [Ho Chi Minh] had had carte blanche over his movement, would the results of the war have been different? That is difficult to say. In some cases - as in 1945 and 1946, he appeared to overestimate the possibility that the United States might decide to recognize his government and the independence of the DRV (although to be fair, from the outset he had warned that Washington might eventually decide to align with the French because of the Cold War).
If [Ho Chi Minh] had had carte blanche over his movement, would the results of the war have been different? That is difficult to say. In some cases - as in 1945 and 1946, he appeared to overestimate the possibility that the United States might decide to recognize his government and the independence of the DRV (although to be fair, from the outset he had warned that Washington might eventually decide to align with the French because of the Cold War).
[विद्रोही] समूहों को किसी अधिक शक्तिशाली दुश्मन को हराने के संबंध में हो ची मिन्ह के विचारों से बहुत कुछ सीखने को मिल सकता है।
[Dissidents] groups would benefit enormously from learning about Ho Chi Minh's ideas on how to defeat a more popular enemy.
[Dissidents] groups would benefit enormously from learning about Ho Chi Minh's ideas on how to defeat a more popular enemy.
सुन त्ज़ु और माओ त्से-तुंग के कई विचार युवा हो ची मिन्ह के स्वभाव में स्वाभाविक रूप से शामिल थे, जो शायद तब भी इन्हीं रणनीतियों का उपयोग करते भले ही वे इनसे अनभिज्ञ होते।
Many of the ideas of Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong came naturally to the young Ho Chi Minh, who would probably have applied the same strategy even had he not been aware of them.
Many of the ideas of Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong came naturally to the young Ho Chi Minh, who would probably have applied the same strategy even had he not been aware of them.
सुन त्ज़ु की कार्यशैली के कई ऐसे पहलू थे जो हो ची मिन्ह को बहुत भाते थे: क) दुश्मन और खुद दोनों को अच्छी तरह समझना, उसकी कमजोरियों और अपनी ताकतों को पहचानना और उसी के अनुसार कदम उठाना, ख) अपने प्रतिद्वंद्वी को हराने या पस्त करने के लिए छल-कौशल और रणनीतियों का खुलकर इस्तेमाल करना, और ग) पूरी तरह से हिंसा का सहारा तभी लेना जब वह अत्यंत आवश्यक हो, क्योंकि उनका मानना था कि सैन्य संघर्ष की तुलना में राजनीतिक संघर्ष अधिक प्रभावी होता है।
There were various aspects of Sun Tzu's approach that appealed to Ho Chi Minh: a) to learn to understand both the enemy and yourself, to seek out his weaknesses and your own strengths, and act accordingly, b) to make ample use of subterfuge and stratagem in order to defeat or disarm your adversary, and c) to use outright violence only when absolutely necessary in the belief that political struggle was more effective than military struggle.
There were various aspects of Sun Tzu's approach that appealed to Ho Chi Minh: a) to learn to understand both the enemy and yourself, to seek out his weaknesses and your own strengths, and act accordingly, b) to make ample use of subterfuge and stratagem in order to defeat or disarm your adversary, and c) to use outright violence only when absolutely necessary in the belief that political struggle was more effective than military struggle.
दीर्घकालिक दृष्टिकोण से, मुझे उम्मीद है कि जैसे-जैसे वियतनाम अंतरराष्ट्रीय बाजार से गहरे संबंधों के साथ एक अधिक समृद्ध समाज के रूप में विकसित होगा, वह बाहरी दुनिया को लेकर अपने मन से अंतर्निहित संदेह को छोड़ देगा और हाल ही में थाईलैंड और मलेशिया में हुई प्रगति की तर्ज पर विकास करना शुरू करेगा।
In the longer term, I hope that as Vietnam evolves into a more prosperous society with active ties to the international marketplace, it will lose its inherent suspicion of the outside world and begin to develop along the lines of what has recently been happening in Thailand and Malaysia.
In the longer term, I hope that as Vietnam evolves into a more prosperous society with active ties to the international marketplace, it will lose its inherent suspicion of the outside world and begin to develop along the lines of what has recently been happening in Thailand and Malaysia.
आज की दुनिया में सुन त्ज़ु का क्या प्रभाव है? शायद इस सवाल पर अटकलें लगाने के लिए मुझसे बेहतर योग्यता वाले लोग भी मौजूद हैं। सुन त्ज़ु के विचार, जैसा कि उनके प्रसिद्ध ग्रंथ में व्यक्त किए गए हैं, निस्संदेह कई ऐसे क्रांतिकारी आंदोलनों की प्रकृति को प्रभावित करते रहे हैं जो अधिक शक्तिशाली ताकतों के खिलाफ खड़े हैं, और कुछ मामलों में—जैसे वियतनाम में—उन्होंने सफलता दिलाने में एक उपयोगी भूमिका निभाई है। लेकिन ऐसे विचार हमेशा अन्य गहरी भावनात्मक ताकतों के साथ संघर्ष में रहते हैं, जो विद्रोही आंदोलनों को अंधाधुंध आतंकवाद और अराजक संघर्ष के अन्य रूपों की ओर धकेल देते हैं।
What is the influence of Sun Tzu in the world today? Perhaps there are others who are better qualified than I to speculate about that question. Sun Tzu's ideas, as expressed in his famous treatise, have undoubtedly influenced the nature of many revolutionary movements that are arrayed against more powerful forces, and in some cases - as in Vietnam - have played a useful role in bringing about success. But such ideas are always in conflict with other deepseated emotional factors, which propel dissident movements into the rampant use of terrorism and other forms of anarchistic struggle.
What is the influence of Sun Tzu in the world today? Perhaps there are others who are better qualified than I to speculate about that question. Sun Tzu's ideas, as expressed in his famous treatise, have undoubtedly influenced the nature of many revolutionary movements that are arrayed against more powerful forces, and in some cases - as in Vietnam - have played a useful role in bringing about success. But such ideas are always in conflict with other deepseated emotional factors, which propel dissident movements into the rampant use of terrorism and other forms of anarchistic struggle.
मैंने अमेरिका लौटने के बाद अकादमिक करियर बनाने का फैसला किया और यह तय किया कि मैं वियतनाम की सफलता के रहस्य को जानने के लिए आगे चलकर हो ची मिन्ह के जीवन का अध्ययन करूँगा।
I decided that after returning to the US to pursue an academic career I would eventually study the life of Ho Chi Minh to find the secret of his success.
I decided that after returning to the US to pursue an academic career I would eventually study the life of Ho Chi Minh to find the secret of his success.
हो ची मिन्ह ने शायद ही कभी सुन त्ज़ु के बारे में लिखा हो, लेकिन जब भी उन्होंने इस प्राचीन चीनी सैन्य रणनीतिकार का उल्लेख किया, तो हमेशा उनकी प्रशंसा की, और कभी-कभी वियतनामी क्रांतिकारी आंदोलन के पालन के लिए उनके विचारों को एक आदर्श के रूप में प्रस्तुत किया।
Ho Chi Minh rarely wrote about Sun Tzu, but when he did mention the ancient Chinese military strategist, he was always laudatory, and he sometimes cited his ideas as a model for the Vietnamese revolutionary movement to follow.
Ho Chi Minh rarely wrote about Sun Tzu, but when he did mention the ancient Chinese military strategist, he was always laudatory, and he sometimes cited his ideas as a model for the Vietnamese revolutionary movement to follow.
अंततः, 1954 में [हो ची मिन्ह] जिनेवा समझौते के लिए राजी हो गए, जिसके तहत देश को अस्थायी रूप से दो हिस्सों में बांट दिया गया था, इस उम्मीद में कि राष्ट्रीय चुनाव देश को उनके नेतृत्व में एकजुट कर सकेंगे।
Finally, in 1954 [Ho Chi Minh] agreed to the Geneva Agreement, which divided the country temporarily into two zones, in the hope that national elections might unify the country under his leadership.
Finally, in 1954 [Ho Chi Minh] agreed to the Geneva Agreement, which divided the country temporarily into two zones, in the hope that national elections might unify the country under his leadership.
द्वितीय विश्व युद्ध के दौरान जब उन्होंने चीन में सेवा की, तो [हो ची मिन्ह] ने जापानी सेना (और बाद में च्यांग काई-शेक की सेना) के खिलाफ माओ त्से-तुंग की गुरिल्ला युद्ध की रणनीतियों के बारे में सीखा, और उन्होंने माओ की कुछ रचनाओं का वियतनामी भाषा में अनुवाद भी किया। लेकिन यह स्पष्ट है कि दुश्मन का मुकाबला करने को लेकर उनके अपने विचार भी बिल्कुल वैसे ही थे।
When he served in China during World War II, [Ho Chi Minh] learned about Mao Zedong's tactics of guerrilla war against the Japanese (and later against Chiang Kai-shek's forces), and he translated some of Mao's works into Vietnamese. But it is clear that his own ideas on how to counter the enemy ran along the same lines.
When he served in China during World War II, [Ho Chi Minh] learned about Mao Zedong's tactics of guerrilla war against the Japanese (and later against Chiang Kai-shek's forces), and he translated some of Mao's works into Vietnamese. But it is clear that his own ideas on how to counter the enemy ran along the same lines.
मुझे यह मानने का कोई कारण नजर नहीं आता कि वियतनाम की कम्युनिस्ट पार्टी (VCP) वियतनाम में सत्ता की बागडोर अपने हाथों से जाने देगी। देश में ऐसा कोई भी संगठित बल मौजूद नहीं है जो सत्ता के लिए VCP को टक्कर दे सके। और पार्टी आज भी यही मानती है कि उसे डर दिखाकर और राजनीतिक पटल पर अपना दबदबा कायम करके ही शासन करना चाहिए। असल में, उसने हो ची मिन्ह की उस विरासत को छोड़ दिया है जिसके अनुसार लोगों को बल के बजाय persuasion (समझाइश और मनाने) से जीता जाना चाहिए—यह एक ऐसा सिद्धांत था जिसका पालन खुद हो ची मिन्ह ने भी हमेशा नहीं किया।
I see no reason to believe that the Vietnamese Communist Party will lose control over the reins of power in Vietnam. There is no organized force in the country that is capable of competing with the VCP for power. And the party still believes that it must rule by intimidation and by dominating the political scene In effect, it has abandoned that part of Ho Chi Minh's legacy that the people must be won over by persuasion rather than by force - a dictum that Ho Chi Minh did not always follow himself.
I see no reason to believe that the Vietnamese Communist Party will lose control over the reins of power in Vietnam. There is no organized force in the country that is capable of competing with the VCP for power. And the party still believes that it must rule by intimidation and by dominating the political scene In effect, it has abandoned that part of Ho Chi Minh's legacy that the people must be won over by persuasion rather than by force - a dictum that Ho Chi Minh did not always follow himself.
1946 के वसंत में [हो ची मिन्ह] ने वियतनाम की स्वतंत्रता को लेकर उपजे विवाद के बीच एक समझौते के तहत फ्रांसीसी प्रतिनिधि के साथ एक अंतरिम समझौते पर हस्ताक्षर किए। एक बार फिर, वे शायद यह उम्मीद करने में थोड़े भोले साबित हुए थे कि समझौता वास्तव में संभव था।
In the spring of 1946 [Ho Chi Minh ] signed a provisional agreement with the French representative on a compromise solution to the dispute over Vietnamese independence. Once again, he might have been naive in hoping that a compromise was really possible.
In the spring of 1946 [Ho Chi Minh ] signed a provisional agreement with the French representative on a compromise solution to the dispute over Vietnamese independence. Once again, he might have been naive in hoping that a compromise was really possible.
अंत में, उनके कई कट्टर सहयोगियों को यह लगने लगा था कि [हो ची मिन्ह] की समझौता करने की प्रवृत्ति और दुश्मन का सीधे तौर पर सामना करने से उनकीि हिचकिचाहट, उनकी कमजोरी की निशानी है। 1963-1965 में अमेरिका का सीधे मुकाबला करने का निर्णय इस बात की दबी हुई स्वीकृति थी कि हो ची मिन्ह की नीति असफल हो चुकी थी।
In the end, many of his more militant colleagues began to feel that [Ho Chi Minh's] tendency to compromise, and his reluctance to confront the enemy directly, was a sign of weakness. The decision to confront the United States in 1963-1965 was a tacit recognition that Ho's approach had failed.
In the end, many of his more militant colleagues began to feel that [Ho Chi Minh's] tendency to compromise, and his reluctance to confront the enemy directly, was a sign of weakness. The decision to confront the United States in 1963-1965 was a tacit recognition that Ho's approach had failed.